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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
pany, and, like the domestic forwarders, own no means of transportation. Pres-
ently "the number of ocean freight forwarders operating as NVOCCs has been
limited and there have been no problems . . . in the duplication of bills of
lading, '24 even though, as in the domestic field, both the forwarder and the
underlying carrier issue bills of lading.
CONCLUSION
The "freight forwarder problem" appears to be a theoretical and not a
practical problem. While in theory it is possible to have competing holders of
bills of lading for the same goods in the freight forwarder situation, the facts
would suggest that the problem never arises in practice. Although the possibility
does exist that a freight forwarder might demand and get a negotiable bill of
lading and thereafter negotiate it to a holder of a duly negotiated document, the
possibility seems quite remote. A simple way to eliminate the doubt that this
problem might ever arise would be an I.C.C. regulation forbidding the issuance
of a negotiable bill of lading to a freight forwarder. Other alternatives, equally
simple, could remove all doubt that a forwarder might be able to negotiate its
bill to a holder of a duly negotiated document; for example, different color bills
of lading could be required to be issued to a forwarder than to a "usual" shipper;
or the carrier could be required to write on the bill of lading, after the for-
warder's name the fact that it is a forwarder (i.e., "John Doe Co., a forwarder").
There are, as seen, many easy cures to the "freight forwarder problem" that
would make section 7-503(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code as unnecessary
in theory as it is in reality.
HENRY K. GASON
DOES RESIDENCE EQUAL DOMICILE? DIVORCE REGULATION UNDER
NEW YORK DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW SECTION 250
Section 2501 of the New York Domestic Relations Law was approved on
April 27, 1966, and will become effective September 1, 1967. It provides:
Proof that a person obtaining a divorce in another jurisdiction was (a)
domiciled in this state within twelve months prior to the commencement
of the proceeding therefor, and resumed residence in this state within
eighteen months after the date of his departure therefrom, or (b) at all
times after his departure from this state and until his return maintained
a place of residence within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that
the person was domiciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was
commenced.
Vessel Carriers, 6 Fed. Maritime Bd. 245 (1961). See also Letter From Gerald Ullman Esq.,
supra note 20.
24. Letter From Gerald Ullman Esq., supra note 20.
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 11.
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 11.
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This Note will explore the alternatives available to the New York courts in inter-
preting section 250 as well as the probable effect of this section upon recognition
of foreign divorces.
I. DoMicILE
Section 250 creates a rule of evidence which makes certain facts prima facie
evidence of "domicile." But domicile is not defined by the section, thereby relegat-
ing the definition to the courts. Domicile has different meanings in different con-
texts; even in the single area of jurisdiction in a divorce action, the term has
varied in meaning and effect. Originally, the courts looked to the husband's
domicile as the locus of the "marital res."13 Today there are basically two the-
ories regarding domicile as a basis for the court's exercise of its jurisdiction in
divorce actions.
The modern conservative theory favors the common law definition of domicile.
This view of domicile is defined by Wharton as "a residence acquired as a final
abode. To constitute it there must be (1) residence, actual or inchoate; (2) the
non-existence of any intention to make a domicile elsewhere." 4 The advocates of
this doctrine take the position that "the character of the residence is of no im-
portance; and, if domicile has once existed, mere temporary absence will not
destroy it, however long continued [; but] when one domicile is abandoned and
a new one selected and entered upon, length of time is not important; one day
will be sufficient, provided the animus exists." 5
The liberal theory favors a less doctrinal approach to the definition of domi-
cile. This approach varies from minor disagreement with the conservative view
regarding an objective intention to remain a permanent resident, to abolition
of the concept of domicile in its entirety0 However, this liberal theory has yet
to be reflected in case law or endorsed by legislation.
Section 250 appears to be based on the conservative theory, although this
would be more of a certainty if the New York Legislature also had enacted sec-
tion one of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act which makes such an intention
explicit. For the remainder of this commentary, it will be presumed that "domi-
cile" within section 250 is based on the conservative view.
II. THE STATUTE
Section 250 changes the evidentiary weight of certain facts which usually
were required by the common law to be established in order to prove domicile.
The operative facts (i.e., length of absence or maintainence of a residence) be-
3. See, e.g., Griswald, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A
Comparative Study, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1951).
4. Wharton, Conflict of Laws § 21 (1805).
5. White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888). But see Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws 62 (3d ed. 1949). See also 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws 134 (1934).
6. Stimpson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of eh Domiciliary
Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956).
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come prima facie evidence of domicile under this section. The subjective inten-
tion of the party to remain a domiciliary of the attacking state no longer need
be shown.
Under subsection (a), certain minimum absences from the state preceded
and followed by residence here, are insufficient to change domicile. This would
seem to allow a New York court to reopen the issue of the jurisdiction of the
out-of-state court where that state's residency requirement is shorter than the
limits set out in subsection (a).7
Subsection (b), if read literally, would give New York courts the power
to set aside an out-of-state divorce granted to a person who has never been a
domiciliary of this state. By placing the beginning of subsection (a) before the
reference to domicile, the legislature has made it difficult to read subsection (b)
with any logical consistency. A literal reading of the introduction and subsec-
tion (b) is grammatically impossible. Such a reading would equate maintaining
a residence with continued domicile, which probably exceeds the bounds of the
full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. The New York
courts have two options available: transpose the designation of subsection (a) to
its proper place after "therefor, and"; or strike down subsection (b) entirely as
unconstitutional.
Assuming the courts read the statute as it should have been drafted, sub-
section (b) will still be a significant change in the law. It makes the mere fact
that a person maintained a New York residence during his absence from the
state evidence of domicile. This would make the common law element of intention
to remain a domiciliary irrelevant. By the operation of this subsection, maintain-
ing a residence alone is prima facie evidence of domicile. Ours is a highly mobile
society where many people have more than one residence, yet it is generally
held that a person can have only one domicile. Thus, equating domicile with
residence is a radical departure from the conservative view of domicile.
Section 250 as adopted in New York is a slightly modified 8 version of sec-
tion two of the 1948 Uniform Divorce Recognition Act 9 The act, which is de-
signed to make state laws uniform in their enforcement of foreign divorce de-
crees, 10 has been enacted in ten states, other than New York, since 1949.1"
7. E.g., Nevada requires six weeks residence for plaintiff in a divorce action, Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 125.020(2) (1963).
8. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 11 omits "from the bonds of matrimony" after
"divorce" from the first sentence of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act § 2.
9. Uniform Divorce Recognition Act § 2.
10. See Uniform Divorce Recognition Act, Commissioner's Prefatory Note:
This act takes its inception from the public dissatisfaction which has arisen over
the practice of "migratory divorce," whereby residents of one state journey to an-
other to take advantage of laxer or more speedy divorce procedures than those af-
forded by the state of their domicile.
Public opinion increasingly recognizes the ills which spring from this situation.
Those able to embark on divorce-seeking tours obtain a discriminatory advantage
over their fellow citizens. Respect for local law is destroyed. The effectiveness of
state policy is broken down. The autonomy in local affairs which is the object of
federalism is subverted. Since the "quickie" divorces are obtained in large measure
by persons whose conduct is regarded as "newsworthy," the resultant publicity helps
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III. VALiDITY OF DIVORCE DECREES UNDER THE ACT
The drafters of the Uniform Act intended to create a rule of evidence to be
used in attacking the validity of an out-of-state court's finding of jurisdiction
based on domicile. Although the intention was laudable, the results have been
disappointing. In the fifteen years the Uniform Act has been in effect in Cali-
fornia, "not one case has been found where the application of the act has brought
about a result different from that which would be reached under the common
law.1 ' 2 This opinion is substantiated by a survey of case law in other enacting
states: in only one case was the act clearly applied and upheld in application
to an ex parte sister state decree.13 In two others the act was held not to apply
to bilateral divorce decrees. 14 Although applicable, the act was either ignored
or not considered in four other cases. 1
In general, the effectiveness of the act since its inception might best be
shown by the following: "For the most part, the act has been a dead letter and
in 1965 the commissioners sent out inquiries as to whether or not the Act
should be retained as a recommended uniform act."' 6
to establish a pattern of disrespect for law and social institutions. The impression
of well-to-do and influential elements of the community that they need not be
hampered by inconvenient restrictions of their local laws renders difficult the pro-
motion of measures of reform. Actually, however, the validity of subsequent mar-
riages, the status of children, title to property, rights of inheritance and many other
incidents of life are rendered uncertain by the cloud of invalidity hanging over the
"tourist" divorce.
11. Cal. Ann. Civ. Code §§ 150-150.4 (Deering 1960) (California has added § 150.4,
which makes the act expressly subject to and limited by the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution.); N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 459:1-459:4 (1955); Nebr. Rev.
Stat. J§ 42-341-42-344 (1949); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 15-6-1-15-6-4 (1956) (Rhode Island
limits the application of the statute to ex parte divorce decrees.); Wash. Rev. Code §§
26.08.200-26.08.210 (1949); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 247.22 (1955); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-131 to
20-134 (1962); N. Dak. Cent. Code § 14:1201-14:1218 (1953); La. Rev. Stat. § 9:352-
9:354 (Supp. 1952) [Louisiana later repealed the statute, La. Acts 1954, No. 616, § 13; Mont.
Rev. Code § 21-150 (1963) (Montana has limited the statute to apply only to ex parte
divorce decrees and further added: "Otherwise, the burden for impeaching the validity of
a foreign divorce decree shall rest upon the assailant and prima facie validity shall be
accorded to divorce decrees of sister states").
12. Note, 16 Hastings L.J. 121 (1965).
,13. Yost v. Yost, 161 Neb. 164, 72 N.W.2d 689 (1955).
14. Solley v. Solley, 227 Cal. App. 2d 522, 38 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1964) (act does not
apply; party to Nevada bilateral divorce is estopped from collateral attack); Hartenstein v.
Hartenstein, 18 Wis. 2d 505, 118 N.W.2d 881 (1963) (The act does not apply to bilateral de-
crees.).
15. Carmichael v. Carmichael, 216 Cal. App. 2d 674, 31 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1963) (Over-
whelming evidence that husband was not a Nevada domiciliary at time he procured ex parte
Nevada divorce made it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the act.) ; Nevin v.
Nevin, 88 R.I. 426, 149 A.2d 722 (1959) (Evidence sustained finding that wife acquired
bona fide domicile for Nevada ex parte divorce, and hence unnecessary to decide whether
the act applied or not.); James v. Williams, 247 S.C. 100, 145 S.E.2d 683 (1965) (No men-
tion of the act even though relevant to issues.); Craney v. Low, 46 Cal. 2d 757, 298 P.2d
860 (1956) (ignores and circumvents the act, referring to Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951),
and the full faith and credit obligation; also presumed that Nevada divorce was bilateral
rather than ex parte in absence of proof to the contrary).
16. Foster & Freed, Law and the Family (Supp. 1966, at 34).
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Standing of Sister State Bilateral Decrees
The standing of a sister state bilateral divorce decree in the several states,
including New York, is controlled by the United States Supreme Court decisions
of Sherrer v. Sherrer,17 Cook v. Cook'8 and Johnson v. Muelberger.19 The Skerrer
case states:
[T]he requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from col-
laterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the
courts of a sister State where there has been participation by the de-
fendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been ac-
corded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where
the decree is not susceptible to such collateral attack in the courts of the
State which rendered the decree 20
Thus, the basic premise in a bilateral divorce case is that both parties have
participated in the proceeding and had an opportunity to contest the jurisdic-
tional basis of domicile and therefore, since the decree is res judicata, the issue
is waived or conclusive as between the parties. In Johnson v. Muelberger2l the
Supreme Court extended this rationale, holding that a collateral attack by a
stranger to the divorce action was forbidden under the full faith and credit clause
unless permitted in the rendering state.22 In Cook v. Cook23 the Court reinforced
the policy underlying the Johnson and Sherrer cases, holding that a divorce de-
cree gives rise to a presumption of jurisdiction over both parties 2 4
Section 250 probably will have no effect on the validity of sister state bi-
lateral divorce decrees in New York. The Supreme Court in Sherrer, Cook and
Johnson has pre-empted the field by interpreting the full faith and credit clause.
Only one case has been found in which the act was so applied and upheld and
its constitutionality may be doubtful 2 5 If the New York State courts applied
the act to bilateral decrees, they would be using a legislative rule of evidence to
overcome a presumption established by the Supreme Court for the constitutional
17. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
18. 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
19. 304 U.S. 581 (1951).
20. 334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
21. 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (Daughter attacked the validity of her deceased father's
Florida divorce since by his will he left everything to her, but his wife by a later marriage
filed notice of election to one third of the estate.).
22. U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and Effect thereof."
28 U.S.C. § 687 (1957) provides in part: ". . . And the said records and judicial pro-
ceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the
United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are
taken."
See Comment, Collateral Attack on Foreign Divorces: Proof of the Foreign Law, 8
Buffalo L. Rev. 389 (1959).
23. 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
24. See Comment, supra note 22.
25. Zenker v. Zenker, 161 Neb. 200, 72 N.W.2d 809 (1955) (Act upheld as applied to
bilateral divorce decree; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) distinguished.).
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implementation of the full faith and credit clause. Therefore such use by the
New York State courts might be unconstitutional.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that a bilateral decree was open to col-
lateral attack by a stranger to the decree, to the same extent such attack would
be allowed in the rendering state.2 6 If the rendering state did allow an attack
by a stranger, yet did not have a divorce recognition statute, it is doubtful that
section 250 could be used as a rule of evidence in such an attack, since this
would be an attack to an extent not allowed in the rendering state.
Standing of Sister State Ex Parte Decrees
The standing of a sister state ex parte divorce decree in New York is con-
trolled by the decision in Williams v. North Carolina (IJ).27 The Supreme Court
held that where only one party appears before the divorcing state's forum, and
the court asserts jurisdiction over the "marital res," the same forum may not
foreclose a re-examination of the jurisdictional basis for the divorce decree.28
However, the Court has indicated, by affirmance of the trial court's charge to
this effect, that full faith and credit must be given to the decree to the extent
that such decree is prima facie evidence that the divorcing party was a domi-
ciliary of the divorcing state 29 The Court further stated that the assailant has
a "heavy burden" 30 when attacking such a decree and the reviewing state may
not place "unfair barriers" in the way of such decrees nor weight the scales in
favor of the assailant.3
1
It is difficult to estimate the effect of the application of section 250 to ex
parte sister state decrees in New York. If a case arises in which the proof of
lack of domicile in the rendering state is substantial the statute is at best super-
fluous. On the other hand, if the proof tends to substantiate the claim of domi-
cile in the rendering state, the use of the statute might be inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion in Williams (II).32 Whether the latter use is so incon-
sistent as to raise unfair barriers to recognition33 or unfairly weight the scales of
justice in favor of the assailant,34 who has a heavy burdenf 5 is the determina-
tive issue. The question of whether the act can constitutionally stand depends
26. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
27. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
28. Id. at 234.
29. Sd. at 236 (The Court said that the charge of the trial court granting "prima facie
evidence" sufficient to warrant a finding of domicile in Nevada but not compelling "such an
inference," discharged the full faith and credit obligation.).
30. Id. at 233.
31. Sd. at 236. See generally Comment, supra note 22. See also Note, 34 Cornell L.Q.
263 (1948); Note, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 317 (1949); Note, 22 Temp. L.Q. 241 (1948); Note, 34
Va. L. Rev. 709 (1948); Paulsen, Divorce Jurisdiction by Consent of the Parties: Develop-
ments Since "Sherrer v. Sherrer", 26 Ind. L.J. 381 (1952); Comment, Stranger Attack on
Sister State Decrees of Divorce, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 376 (1957); Stimson, Jurisdiction in
Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956).
32. Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
33. Id. at 236.
34. Ibid.
35. Id. at 233.
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upon the outcome of this issue. Williams (II) further stated there must be a
"fair determination by appropriate procedure ' 36 and a finding adverse to juris-
diction by reason of domicile in the rendering state must be "amply supported
in evidence." 37 The "rule of evidence" established by section 250 does not create
a presumption of domicile in New York State. It is only prima facie evidence of
domicile where a party's actions, which are deemed indications of domiciliary
intent, make him subject to the act.
If it is assumed that the prima facie weight of the new statutory rule of evi-
dence established by section 250, is at least equal to the prima facie weight of the
foreign decree, what has been accomplished? Since Williams(II) places the bur-
den of proof on the assailant and further states that a finding in favor of such
assailant must be "amply supported in evidence," it does not follow that mere
application of section 250 is sufficient to overcome that burden. It would seem
that equating the two rules of evidence leaves only the bare facts required for
the operation of section 250 to carry the burden of proof. However, these few
facts would probably not be sufficient to adequately carry this burden since
the Supreme Court has indicated that a finding against domicile in the render-
ing state must have ample support. If this is true, the assailant must show more
than meet the heavy burden of proof. The conclusion is that the assailant must
show some "extra" evidence to enable him to meet his burden of proof. "Extra"
evidence, in this context, would mean evidence other than the operative facts
of the act. Just how much "extra" evidence would be necessary is not clear, but
at least it would have to create a preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, three possible results from the application of the act remain. First, if
the assailant does not produce enough evidence to allow a finding adverse to the
rendering state's finding of domicile, would not an adverse finding by operation
of the act alone be unconstitutional as an unfair weight in favor of the assail-
ant?3 8 Second, if the assailant is able to produce substantial evidence of the de-
fendant's lack of domicile, is not the use of section 250, even as an aid to
impeaching the foreign decree, little more than superfluous? Third, the final
possibility is the use of section 250 in the "grey areas" between the two above
situations; that is, the act might be used effectively where enough facts are found
to allow its application as well as create a preponderance with "extra" facts.
These combined facts, without the application of section 250, at common law,
might not have been enough to constitutionally allow a finding adverse to the
rendering state's finding of domicile.
A Mexican ex parte divorce decree is valid in New York if the party estab-
lishes bona fide domicile, by New York standards, in a Mexican state, provided
the absent spouse has been duly notified of the proceedings.39 Where no attempt
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 233.
39. Imbrioscia v. Qualle, 197 Misc. 1049, 96 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1950), rev'd on
other grounds, 278 App. Div. 144, 103 N.Y.S.2d 593 (lst Dep't 1959). See Laufer, Mexican
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to establish domicile has been made, a Mexican ex parte divorce, will be treated
much like a "mail order" or "quicky" divorce and will not be recognized by New
York courts. 40
A bilateral Mexican divorce where the one party personally appears before
the court, and the other appears either personally, by a duly authorized repre-
sentative, or by filing papers indicating submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, is recognized as valid as a matter of comity in New York.41 Under comity,
as contrasted with full faith and credit, New York courts have power to ignore a
decree rendered outside the United States, for reasons of public policy alone,
despite any claims or findings of jurisdiction made by the foreign court.42 Thus,
domicile as a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction in a foreign country
bilateral divorce is not at issue when the state courts examine a foreign country
decree.43 Therefore, "lack of domicile, as the concept is generally applied in the
United States, is not necessarily a bar to recognition of a foreign divorce.1 44
The extent to which section 250 is applicable to Mexican or foreign country
divorce decrees is unclear and probably the area most open for dispute. In
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstie4 5 the Court of Appeals held that domicile was not re-
quired for the parties in a Mexican participation divorce to have the decree
recognized as valid in New York and that "the sole criterion by which these
decrees may be judged is whether they contravene our public policy." 40 In the
light of this and prior New York decisions, the intention in enacting section 250
must be ascertained to predict its affects in the area of foreign country decrees.
The New York State Legislature must have been aware of the practical sig-
nificance and public furor caused by the Rosenstiel decision.47 It is therefore pos-
sible to conclude that the legislature intended section 250 to be a legislative
overruling of Rosenstiel. Also, when one considers that the main reason migratory
divorces were a problem in New York was the unrealistic nature of its former
divorce laws, the argument can be made that now that New York has liberalized
Divorces for New Yorkers, Sixteenth Session Outline, Television Presentation of the State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School, p. 6 (Jan. 1966).
40. Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929); Rosenbaum v. Rosen-
ubam, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 ('1955).
41. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
42. See authorities cited in Note, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 556, 557 nn.5-7 (1965). See also
Laufer, op. cit. supra note 39, p. 6: "To the extent that New York recognizes judgments and
decrees, including divorce decrees of any foreign country, it does so on the principle of
'comity,' a judicial rule based on the notion that it will contribute to justice, stability and
orderly international cooperation if state A will give effort to validly entered judgments of
foreign country B provided that they meet minimum standards of due process and do not
violate state A's public policy"; Kulzer, Some Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judg-
ments: A Comparative Summary, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 84 (1966).
43. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 131 N.E.2d 902 (1955).
44. Note, supra note 42.
45. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965).
46. Id. at 79, 209 N.E.2d at 716, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 95 (Scileppi, J., dissenting, quoting
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955)). [Emphasis omitted.).
47. Foster & Freed, Law and the Family (Supp. 1966, at 33).
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its divorce laws,48 recognition of Mexican divorce decrees is unnecessary and
thus they should no longer be recognized as a matter of comity.
There are four primary reasons why section 250 should not be read as a
statutory overruling of Rosenstiel, nor a change in policy towards recognition
of foreign country divorce decrees. First, section 250 is a Uniform Act which
applies only when domicile is an issue; since domicile is not an issue in the recog-
nition of Mexican divorce decrees, 49 there is no need to refer to the act. Second,
it could be argued that enactment of section 250 was intended to make domicile
indispensable to jurisdiction in all divorce recognition cases regardless of origin.
If that was the intention of the legislators, they also could have enacted section
one of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act8 0 which makes domicile a require-
ment for jurisdiction in all divorce decrees. The New York State Legislature
could have specifically included foreign country decrees under the act by a sim-
ple amendment to the uniform version or by a separate section under the Domes-
tic Relations Law. In the absence of such a provision it is reasonable to conclude
that no effect was intended on foreign country decrees. Third, the legislature
could have left us a guide to its intention by means of legislative notes or com-
ments regarding the application of section 250 to foreign country decrees. In the
absence of such comment it seems reasonable to conclude that the act was not
meant as a statutory overruling of case law. An overruling is more likely to be
accompanied by a specific comment to that effect, as is usual practice.51 Finally,
when one considers that comity, which is a matter of public policy, is the con-
trolling factor in foreign country decree recognition cases, it would be more
likely that the legislature would enact a policy section, such as section one52
rather than section two of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act which only
provides a rule of evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that the use of section 250 of the Domestic relations Law
will have a very narrow effect on sister state bilateral decrees. It will only be
used by a stranger to the decree who collaterally attacks the decree when the
rendering state allows the collateral attack and the use of such a rule of evidence
for the attack. Such a combination, when one considers that the rendering state
is the least likely (if it is a "divorce mill" state) to have enacted a divorce recog-
nition statute, will be extremely rare.
48. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254 (six grounds for divorce will be available under the
new law instead of the single ground (adultery) that has existed for 179 years).
49. Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375, 130 N.E.2d 86 (1955); Foster &
Freed, Law and the Family (Supp. 1966, at 33).
50. Uniform Divorce Recognition Act 1 1 (1955): "Validity of Foreign Decree-A
divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another jurisdiction shall be of no force
or effect in this state, if both parties to the marriage were domiciled in this state at the
time the proceedings for the divorce commenced."
51. See, e.g., N.Y. Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, Revisers' Notes and Comments to
§ 5-1.4 (1966); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Revisers' Notes and Comments to § 202(a)(15)
(McKinney 1962).
52. See supra note 50.
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Section 250 may have some small effect on ex parte sister state decrees, but
it is more likely to be superfluous or held unconstitutional depending on the
amount of evidence the assailant is able to present.
In the area of foreign country decrees where a New York court is not bound
by the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the application of section
250 will be open to debate. The effect of the act in this area is not likely to be
recognized as a statutory overruling of Rosenstiel and prior case law.
One difficulty in understanding the New York legislators' intention in
enacting section 250 is its past history. The same statute has had little or no
effect in ten other enacting states for the past eighteen years. The inherent defects
in draftsmanship would seem to prejudice the statute's chances for being con-
stitutionally sustained under judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court decisions in
the area of divorce recognition since it was first enacted may indeed destroy the
usefulness of the act.
When these factors are combined with the lack of legislative notes or com-
ments to section 250, its existence is not easily reconciled with its supposed goals.
It would appear that when the New York legislature finished reforming the
divorce laws it added section 250 primarily to keep New Yorker's divorces before
New York courts.
MIcHAnrI L. MCCARTHY
THE "UNFAIR" INTERESTED DIRECTORS' CONTRACT UNDER THE
NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
According to the majority common law rule a contract between a director
and his corporation, or between corporations with interlocking directorates, will
be enforced if the contract is basically "fair" to the corporation but may be
avoided if "unfair."1 This rule seems to have been extended by section 713 (a) of
the New York Business Corporation Law, which provides in part:
713. Interested directors.-(a) No contract or other transaction be-
tween a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a
corporation and any other corporation, firm, association or other entity
in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers, or are
financially interested, shall be either void or voidable for this reason
alone or by reason alone that such director or directors are present at
the meeting of the board, or of a committee thereof, which authorizes
such contract or transaction, or that his or their votes are counted for
such purpose:
(1) If the fact of such common directorship, officership or finan-
cial interest is disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the
1. See generally 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1307 (1965); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1062,
1064 (1954).
